Abstract-This paper studies the medium access design for secondary users (SUs) from a game-theoretic learning perspective. In consideration of the random return of primary users (PUs), a distributed SU access approach is presented based on an adaptive carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) scheme, in which each SU accesses multiple idle frequency slots of a licensed frequency band with adaptive activity factors. The problem of finding optimal activity factors of SUs is formulated as a potential game, and the existence, feasibility, and optimality of Nash equilibrium (NE) are analyzed. Furthermore, to achieve NEs of the formulated game, learning-based algorithms are developed in which each SU independently adjusts its activity factors. Convergence properties of best-response dynamics and log-linear dynamics are studied. Subsequently, by learning other SUs' behavior from locally available information, the convergence with probability of one to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the globally optimal solution is investigated by both analysis and simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N hierarchical cognitive radio networks, the design of an efficient distributed medium access scheme for secondary users (SUs) is challenging due to the conflicts with licensed primary users (PUs) and hence has received considerable attention [1] - [3] . When studying medium access design in a cognitive radio network, a key concern is how to manage spectrum sharing among SUs in a distributed manner. The simplicity, success, and coexistence capability of the listen-before-talk random access scheme has the potential to be applied for the early cognitive systems [4] . For instance, carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) has been used in the literature to randomly allocate channel times among competing SUs (e.g., in [5] - [7] ).
Furthermore, the new wireless standard IEEE 802.11af, which has been recently introduced to implement an enhanced type of Wi-Fi using TV white spaces, will also use a CSMA-based protocol for spectrum sharing [8] - [10] .
However, a random access scheme (e.g., CSMA) suffers from low channel utilization because of inevitable contention among users. To improve the efficiency, efforts have been exerted on optimizing random access performance (e.g., in [11] and [12] ). Regarding IEEE 802.11 medium access control operation, in [13] , an opportunistic CSMA (O-CSMA) scheme is proposed for a wireless local area network to improve throughput by exploiting multiuser diversity gain. The proposed O-CSMA adopts a channel-adaptive backoff scheme, which prioritizes the users having a high SNR and hence significantly improves throughput [13] . Then, in [14] , a multichannel O-CSMA scheme is proposed, in which high-SNR channels are selected with higher probabilities for orthogonal frequencydivision multiple-access systems. By arranging transmission on favorable channels for multiple users, the proposed O-CSMA reaches the full multiuser diversity gain, despite the distributed operation.
To offer an efficient CSMA scheme that could be compatible with requirements in a cognitive radio network, in addition to channel conditions, PU activity characteristics should be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it is important to perform fair resource allocation among SUs while avoiding collision with PUs. Thus, a more cognitive random access scheme is required to consider conflicts with PUs and fairness among SUs. Accordingly, in [15] , we present an adaptive multichannel CSMA scheme in which adaptive access probabilities (called the activity factor) are adopted for SUs, taking into account PU return probabilities and spectrum sharing incentives in addition to the channel quality functions. Subsequently, the SU activity factor optimization problem for maximizing the overall SU throughput is formulated, and medium access algorithms are developed for SUs.
In this paper, 1 the adaptive CSMA-based access design for SUs is studied in a game-theoretic framework. There are three key reasons for using a game-theoretic approach. First, since game theory explicitly recognizes interactions among autonomous SUs, it enables providing distributed algorithms. Second, game-theoretic algorithms empower us to accelerate the convergence in comparison with the algorithm proposed in 1 Parts of the preliminary results of this work have been presented in [16] .
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. [15] . Third, game theory offers a useful tool for predicting, analyzing, and characterizing the long-run behavior of the system, specifically in comparison with the globally optimal solution. In the proposed game-theoretic algorithm, activity factor selections are made independently and dynamically by each SU, which aims to satisfy its own demand despite imposed sharing incentives. More specifically, the activity factor optimization problem is formulated as an exact potential game. Via a potential game framework, it is proven that the formulated game admits at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), i.e., the stable operating point of the system. Subsequently, the feasibility and efficiency of the NE are investigated. To address incomplete information about the game structure, learning approaches, which can respond optimally to the history information and can achieve NE points, are studied in terms of information requirements and convergence properties. We establish the convergence of the best-response iterations to a pure-strategy NE, which is not essentially the globally optimal solution.
Aiming to enable equilibrium selection, we introduce the log-linear learning process, which is basically a perturbed bestresponse process. Log-linear learning is one of the few learning approaches that assures convergence to the most efficient, globally optimal NE. By introducing noise into the decision-making process, log-linear iterations diverge from the suboptimal NE while moving toward the globally optimal NE, which is robust to noisy perturbations [17] , [18] .
Inspired by how log-linear learning works, we propose a fully distributed algorithm following best-response dynamics in which each SU adjusts its activity factors independently by learning from locally available information. Taking advantage of the noisy observations, it is shown that the best-response iterations will finally stay in a neighborhood of the globally optimal NE with probability of one. This can be explained by the fact that the globally optimal NE of the formulated game is the single stochastically stable NE. In comparison with the learning-based algorithm in [15] , the proposed gametheoretic algorithm in this paper appears to have much faster convergence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work. Section III presents an overview of the system model and introduces the activity factor optimization problem. In Section IV, the medium access design is formulated as an exact potential game. Then, the existence, feasibility, and efficiency of the NE of the formulated game are analyzed. Section V investigates the convergence properties of learning approaches, including the best-response dynamics and the log-linear dynamics. Finally, Section VI presents the concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several works in the literature that address distributed medium access design in hierarchical cognitive radio networks from non-game-theoretic and game-theoretic perspectives. In [5] , [6] , and [19] - [21] , the problem of channel selection is studied, assuming that both PUs and SUs have the same transmission time-slot structure. However, such an assumption of synchronous slotted transmission structure between PU and SU networks is not sensible since it needs good coordination in time between PU and SU networks. In this paper, under the assumption of no time coordination between SUs and PUs, we investigate the medium access design for SUs in consideration of possible collision between a PU and an SU due to PU return.
When studying access design under the effect of PU return, most existing works considered a single SU or a simple mechanism for random sharing among SUs without taking into account the competition or coordination among SUs [7] , [22] . However, a key challenge is how to share opportunities among SUs to achieve a network-level objective. In this paper, some sharing incentives among SUs are applied to avoid channel degradation due to crowding effects. This coordination can lead to higher network performance compared with when each SU picks actions independently and competes randomly to capture the channel.
To satisfy the imposed sharing constraints in a distributed manner, a game-theoretic approach is studied, and learning algorithms, including best-response dynamics and log-linear dynamics, are investigated to reach to the globally optimal solution. In the spectrum sharing literature, there are a few works studying log-linear dynamics to learn equilibrium points. For instance, in [23] , log-linear equilibria (or logit equilibria) for a stochastic game are studied, and in [24] , a log-linear learning algorithm for a strategic game with a unique pure-strategy NE is presented. However, in this paper, log-linear learning is introduced and investigated for a strategic potential game with multiple pure-strategy NEs aiming to enable equilibrium selection.
Subsequently, with the aid of an adaptive CSMA scheme, the fully distributed learning-based access algorithm is proposed in which each SU can locally and independently update its own strategy. The proposed access algorithm distinguishes this paper in coordinating spectrum access among SUs from the previously proposed channel assignment schemes for SUs with support of a central controller (e.g., in [25] ), exploiting a common control channel (e.g., in [26] ) or simple random access (e.g., in [5] ).
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We study a cognitive radio network with N s SUs looking for temporal spectrum availability in N p frequency slots (or channels), which are licensed to PUs. It should be noted that these channels could be considered narrow-band subcarriers in a multicarrier modulation scheme (e.g., orthogonal frequencydivision multiplexing). Each SU is assumed to independently follow its own transmission time frame that is simply divided into equal time intervals; each interval of duration T has two phases: a spectrum sensing phase of τ followed by a spectrum access phase of T −τ . Although each SU has the same values of T and τ , time synchronization is not necessarily required among different SUs since spectrum sharing in each channel is based on a random access scheme, i.e., the adaptive CSMA scheme. In this paper, we assume sufficiently accurate sensing with negligible PU misdetection, focusing on the effects of random PU returns. Perfect sensing could be a sensible assumption in certain scenarios, e.g., applications in which SUs are located inside the service area of the PU transmitter (e.g., in [27] ).
Let N a := {1, . . . , N a } be the set of N a channels that are detected idle in the spectrum sensing and hence can be utilized by N s SUs, and let C i k be the channel quality function for SU k in channel i. A simple example of the channel quality is the transmission capacity represented by From the SU viewpoint, the PU activity in a given channel can be modeled as a two-state continuous-time random process with the OFF-state (0) and ON-state (1) representing the idle and busy periods of the PU. Hence, there will be a nonzero probability of PU return (i.e., α i ) during a spectrum access phase to the channel i, whereas it will be detected idle by SUs in the spectrum sensing phase.
Regarding spectrum sharing, it is assumed that SUs share idle channels using an adaptive CSMA approach. In the proposed CSMA, each SU k enters a competition to access an idle channel i ∈ N a during a spectrum access phase with a certain probability (called intended activity factor), i.e., β
, to be determined based on channel qualities, PU return probabilities, and sharing incentives. Adaptive activity factors enable prioritizing SUs who gain most from using a channel and, hence, improving channel utilization in comparison with a simple random access scheme. Note that β i k is restricted to a binary value in previous studies [5] - [7] , [19] - [21] , such that β i k = 0 expresses that the SU k does not transmit in the channel i and that β i k = 1 represents that the SU k transmits in the channel i for the entire spectrum access phase. Therefore, the proposed transmission scheme with 0 ≤ β i k ≤ 1 generalizes the existing schemes.
More specifically, in the proposed CSMA scheme, each spectrum access phase is divided into S equal subslots with length ((T − τ )/S), which is labeled t 1 , . . . , t S . For every subslot t j in channel i, the SU k performs the following steps.
1) Generate a Bernoulli random variable
3) After expiry of the backoff time, sense the channel i; if it is idle, transmit.
In the proposed CSMA scheme, one SU with the smallest backoff time among the SUs who compete for the same subslot (i.e., x i k (t j ) = 1) will succeed and transmit in this subslot. Let y i k (t j ) be a binary random variable representing the capturing status, i.e., y
Assuming that each SU k keeps track of its capturing status feedback y i k (t j ), the achieved activity factor of SU k in channel i (i.e., the average time proportion of a spectrum access phase that an SU successfully occupies channel i, given the competition among SUs) is obtained as [15] 
where E[.] denotes the mathematical expectation. Then
where
represents the intended activity factor of SU k in the channel i. The probability of obtaining the smallest backoff time to capture the channel is inversely proportional to the number of SUs actively competing to capture the same channel, i.e.,
.
)) for different numbers of SUs (i.e., N s ). In this example, β i k values are chosen randomly according to the uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1). Subsequently, x i k is generated according to a Bernoulli random variable with success probability equal to β i k . It is shown that the gap between the exact expected value in F 1 and the lower bound in F 2 is very small, specifically for a larger number of SUs. Thus, this approximation does not cause any significant loss in terms of performance. Thus, to find a closed-form expression, Pr[y
is approximated with the lower bound, i.e.,
The given expression indicates that the achieved activity factor of each SU using the proposed CSMA scheme depends on the intended activity factors of other SUs.
Since the SU k in channel i transmits partially with achieved activity factorβ i k , its normalized transmission rate isβ
Subsequently, the throughput of SU k in the idle channel i is defined as its successful transmission rate f
k α i expresses the probability that the SU k experiences transmission loss due to PU return in idle channel i (with probability α i ). Thus, due to the congestion nature of channel contention, the throughput of each SU is dependent on the activity factors of other SUs. To study the throughput behavior of each SU with respect to other SUs' actions, we define s 
Based on (5), it is clear that f i k reaches its maximum value at s Thus, to control contention among SUs and achieve higher throughput for each individual SU, we limit the sum of all activity factors of different SUs in each idle channel i to 1, i.e.,
. . , N a . Furthermore, the sum of all activity factors of each SU k over all idle channels i = 1, . . . , N a is set equal to 1, i.e.,
Generally, these constraints enable us to preserve fairness among different SUs.
Aiming to determine the optimal activity factors, the optimization problem is formulated to maximize the overall throughput of all SUs under constraints of
. . , N s . However, to reduce computational complexity, we set the utility function as
The formulated activity factor optimization problem is feasible if N s ≤ N a . Note that this paper introduces the successful transmission rate to establish the utility Fig. 2 . Overall throughput of SUs versus the primary returning probability α i , for fixed Ns = 3, Na = 3, and SNR = 10 dB. function of each SU in each channel. However, most existing works, e.g., [5] , [6] , and [19] - [21] , ignore the effects of random PU returns on the SU transmission, and the utility function of each SU in each channel is defined as its transmission rate. Furthermore, in previous studies [5] , [6] , [19] - [21] , the transmission rate of each SU in each channel is simply defined as the channel bandwidth assuming that number of bits delivered over a channel in one time slot is proportional to its bandwidth. Instead, in this paper, we consider the channel quality function that reflects channel conditions as well.
To investigate the effect of choosing U 1 along with
to find optimal activity factors, we plot the overall throughput of all SUs (i.e.,
versus α i and N s for both scenarios (i.e., using U 1 and U 2 ) in Figs. 2 and 3. In this example, we assume independent channels with the same bandwidth B i = 1 and same α i . Note that we used exhaustive search to find the optimal activity factors while optimizing U 2 . It is shown that the throughput improvement by using U 2 instead of U 1 (along with On the other hand, using U 2 makes the optimization problem nonconvex and computationally complex. It is worth mentioning that we have studied the activity factor allocation problem based on U 2 in [28] . Since the optimization problem is generally nonconvex, the medium access design is cast in a game-theoretic framework. It is shown that the NE of the formulated game can be highly inefficient in terms of total profit for all SUs. However, by setting the utility function as
k ≤ 1, in this paper, it will be shown that the globally optimal solution is achievable through a fully distributed gametheoretic algorithm.
IV. GAME-THEORETIC DESIGN In a highly dynamic environment such as cognitive radio networks, it is practically essential to find a reasonably good solution that can be obtained in a sufficiently fast manner. To this end, here, the CSMA-based design is studied in a gametheoretic framework, which enables distributed implementation and fast convergence to a reasonably good solution. More specifically, we consider a strategic noncooperative game in which the players are SUs.
According to the optimization problem in (6), each SU could simply maximize its transmission rate (i.e.,
However, SUs cannot select activity factors that violate the coupling constraints in (6b). Since it is difficult for SUs to identify feasible activity factors in advance, we consider a penalty mechanism embedded in the payoff function of each SU as a cost function. The penalty mechanism is aimed to satisfy the coupling constraints among different SUs in (6b) by severely punishing the SU who violates each of them. Specifically, we focus on a linear penalty mechanism. Thus, we construct an alternative payoff function for SU k as
and μ i is the penalty factor in channel i, which is a positive scalar. The second term of (7) represents the penalty mechanism in the payoff function of each SU. More specifically, we define the penalty in channel i as
In other words, on one hand, SU k will not be penalized in channel i if β k ] be the pure strategy at SU k and β −k be the pure strategies of all SUs excluding the SU k. A pure strategy defines a specific action that a player can pick from its own strategy set. Such actions are not drawn from a probability distribution, as in the case of mixed strategies. Subsequently, the admissible pure strategies of SU k is defined as
Note that β i k takes discrete values in the proposed CSMA-based algorithm. Then, we can define the noncooperative game for the medium access of SUs as
where N s = {1, . . . , N s } is the set of players of the game (i.e., SUs), B k is the activity factor strategy set of the SU k, and u k is the corresponding payoff function of the SU k defined on the set of pure-strategy profiles
An exact potential game is a strategic game in which the incentive of all players to change their strategies can be expressed in a global potential function. The potential games are easy to analyze since improving each player's utility also increases the value of a potential function [29] . In the following theorem, we demonstrate that the game G falls into the framework of exact potential games.
Theorem 1: The formulated game G is an exact potential game with the following potential function:
(10)
Proof: It is clear that the game G satisfies the exact potential game definition [29] , i.e.,
Thus, G is an exact potential game, and Φ is the potential function of G. Conceptually, a strategic game can reach a steady-state NE point if it exists, from which no player can improve its utility by changing its own strategy unilaterally [30] . In other words, a pure-strategy profile
k=1 ∈ B is a pure-strategy NE if and only if
We are interested in investigating the existence and characteristics, including the feasibility and efficiency of the NE of game G.
A. Existence
First of all, the existence of the NE of game G is studied in the following theorem based on the properties of the potential games.
Theorem 2: Game G admits at least one pure-strategy NE.
Proof: This theorem comes directly from [31, Corollary 4], which states that every finite potential game G has at least one pure-strategy NE.
It should be noted that the payoff function of each SU (i.e., u k ) in (7) is not a continuous function over the strategy set B. Thus, payoff functions are not strictly concave. As a result, it cannot be concluded that the pure-strategy NE of the formulated game G is always unique.
Remark 1: In general, the pure-strategy NE of game G may not be unique.
B. Feasibility
Since the optimization problem in (6) has the coupling constraints in (6b), which are merged in the payoff functions in the formulated game G, it is required to verify if an arbitrary pure-strategy NE is feasible, i.e., satisfying the constraints
. . , N a . Thus, the following theorem presents conditions that assure the feasibility of purestrategy NEs.
Theorem 3: All pure-strategy NEs of game G must be feasible if
Proof: See Appendix A for the proof. Theorem 3 assures that, by properly designing μ i , ∀ i ∈ N a , the payoff functions in (7) can guarantee the feasibility of the steady states of the system.
C. Efficiency
The other aspect that we are interested in studying is how efficient the NE of game G is in comparison with the globally optimal solution of (6). In other words, NE efficiency is measured versus the globally optimal solution of (6). The following theorem specifies the relationship between the globally optimal solution and the NE of game G.
Theorem 4: The globally optimal solution of (6) is the Paretooptimal pure-strategy NE of game G if μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a .
Proof: See Appendix B for the proof. Theorem 4 shows that the globally optimal solution constitutes a pure-strategy NE. From Theorem 4, it follows that the NE must be the globally optimal solution when the NE is unique. However, when multiple NEs exist in the formulated game G, a randomly chosen NE may not be the globally optimal solution. That is why we need to study different learning algorithms to find an iterative algorithm that can guarantee convergence to the most efficient NE (i.e., the globally optimal solution).
Remark 2: In the following, learning-based iterative algorithms are proposed, which enable the convergence to the globally optimal pure-strategy NE.
V. LEARNING EQUILIBRIA
Assuming that the rationality of players and the structure of the game are common knowledge, equilibrium can be observed as a result of analysis and introspection of the players. Otherwise, under the assumption of bounded rationality or partial information, equilibrium may arise as a consequence of a longrun learning process. Here, aiming to achieve an equilibrium of game G, learning approaches are discussed in terms of information requirements and convergence properties.
A. Best-Response Dynamics
To reach an equilibrium of game G, first, a simple learning algorithm for activity factor selection is presented, which is based on the asynchronous best-response dynamics. In particular, at each time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, exactly one SU k ∈ N s is randomly selected to revise its activity factors based on the best-response dynamics defined as
Under perfect knowledge of current strategies of other SUs (i.e., β −k [t − 1]), the convergence of the proposed game-theoretic algorithm is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 5:
The learning algorithm under asynchronous best-response dynamics converges with probability of one to a pure-strategy NE of game G from any initial strategy point.
Proof: Based on [30, Th. 19] , in a finite exact potential game, best-response dynamics will converge with probability of one to a pure-strategy NE in finite steps. Accordingly, in game G, the best-response iterations will converge to a purestrategy NE.
To verify convergence of the best-response dynamics, a numerical result is also provided. In this example, we assume independent channels with the same bandwidth B i = 1 and the same α i . We set the similar SNR = (P i k /n i k ) = 10 dB for individual SUs. Furthermore, we assume N s = 3, N a = 3, and α i = 0.1. Note that we use the same example for all simulation results. Fig. 4 demonstrates the convergence process of the activity factors of three SUs in the first idle licensed channel for a certain channel realization. All SUs start by setting their initial values of their activity factors to zero. In each iteration, they sequentially play to optimize their own payoff functions and update their activity factors based on the best-response dynamics in (15) (e.g., in the following order: SU3, SU2, and SU1). Note that each SU updates its activity factors in three different channels simultaneously. However, due to the limited space, the simulation results for only channel 1 are demonstrated.
In iterations 1, SU3, SU2, and then SU1 play and obtain β In iteration 2, SU3 is penalized for this excessive amount, and for its specific channel realization, Fig. 4 indicates that the SU3 is forced to reduce its activity factor to β 
Thus, their strategies no longer change. Note that, for different channel realizations, it is possible that all SUs change their activity factors to satisfy Fig. 5 shows the convergence of the potential function. As evident from Figs. 4 and 5, in less than ten iterations, activity factor selection converges to an NE that is not essentially the globally optimal solution. Note that each iteration corresponds to a complete update by all the SUs.
According to Theorem 5, the best-response iterations will converge to a pure-strategy NE that is not necessarily the globally optimal solution of (6). Since NE could be highly inefficient with regard to the network-level objective, it is thus crucial to find a learning process to reach the globally optimal solution.
B. Log-Linear Dynamics
Since the basic myopic best-response dynamics suffer from multiple rest points (e.g., any pure-strategy NE), it is essential to introduce a learning process that can select an appropriate equilibrium. Aiming to enable equilibrium selection, the loglinear learning has been proposed as a perturbed best-response process, which guarantees convergence to the most efficient NE for potential games [17] , [18] . The basic idea behind the equilibrium selection in log-linear learning is to introduce noise into the decision-making process, which enables categorizing equilibria based on their stability characteristics. This noise allows players to select suboptimal actions (i.e., nonbest responses) with a certain probability, which is attached with the magnitude of the payoff difference of the best response and the suboptimal action.
In the log-linear learning, SUs are assumed to be myopic and boundedly rational. At each time t > 0, exactly one SU k ∈ N s is randomly selected to update its action, using a probability distribution over its strategy set in response to the current strategy profile. Let k be the player chosen at time t to revise its action. Then, SU k will choose action β k given the current strategy profile β −k [t − 1] with a probability based on the loglinear choice rule, i.e.,
where 0 < (1/ ) < ∞. The scalar (1/ ) can be interpreted as the level of rationality of the SUs. In other words, shows the level of noise in the SUs' decisions and determines how often SUs choose their best responses. The described rule is called log linear since the log-likelihood ratio of selecting between two actions is linearly proportional to the difference of corresponding payoffs, given other SUs' actions [32] . As → 0, the log-linear rule approaches to the best-response rule. However, the SU k will choose any action β k ∈ B k with equal probability as → ∞. Thus, for any 0 < < ∞, SUs explore nonbest responses with nonzero probabilities, which are exponentially smaller for actions yielding smaller payoffs [17] , [18] . Our goal is to characterize the long-run behavior of asynchronous log-linear learning process for game G. To this end, the log-linear dynamic adjustment process is represented as an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain {X t } t∈N on the set of strategy profiles of the game [17] , [18] . Subsequently, based on the study in [17] , the stationary distribution, i.e., limiting distribution in a Markov chain, is studied to explain the longrun behavior of this update rule. Accordingly, the stationary distribution of asynchronous log-linear learning process in game G is presented as
According to (17) , μ (β) (i.e., the probability that X t = β for sufficiently large times t > 0) can be expressed as an explicit function of the potential function. A strategy profile
k=1 is said to be stochastically stable if lim →0 μ (β) > 0. Consequently, the stochastically stable strategy can be computed based on (17) . Corollary 1: In game G, the only stochastically stable strategy profile of asynchronous log-linear learning process is the maximizer of potential function Φ, which is the NE of the potential game G based on [29, Th. 2] . Assuming μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a , the globally optimal solution of (6) is equal to the maximizer of the potential function. As a result, the globally optimal solution of (6) is the only stochastically stable NE.
The importance of this Corollary, which comes directly from [17, Corollary 1] for exact potential games, is twofold, i.e., convergence and equilibrium selection. In particular, this explains that the log-linear learning converges, in probability, to the NE, which is the potential function maximizer (which is also equal to the globally optimal solution in the formulated game G assuming μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a ) with sufficiently large rationality level. In other words, by properly designing the rationality level, log-linear dynamics will ultimately converge to the globally optimal NE in game G.
To verify the convergence properties of log-linear learning, Figs. 6 and 7 show the convergence process of the activity factors of three SUs in the first idle licensed channel for a certain channel realization and the convergence of the potential function, respectively. They confirm that the log-linear iterations lead to the globally optimal solution, despite the bestresponse dynamics. As can be observed, it takes merely around 20 iterations to quickly converge to the globally optimal solution. The other aspect that affects the practicality of a learning process is the convergence speed. From [33, Proposition 152] , assuming μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a , the convergence time of the loglinear learning to be η-close to the globally optimal solution is on the order of N s log log(N s ) + log 1 η
for any initial condition if the rationality level (i.e., (1/ )) is sufficiently large. According to (18) , the convergence time is linearly proportional to the number of SUs using the log-linear learning in game G. Note that, in the proposed adaptive CSMA scheme, a player (SU) updates its strategy for its iterative learning algorithm (using best-response or log-linear dynamics) after a successful transmission and does not need any coordination with other SUs.
Considering the proposed best-response dynamics and loglinear dynamics, each SU (e.g., SU k) needs the sum of current activity factors of all other SUs in each channel (i.e., s
. . , N a ) to update its own strategy. Up to this point, we assume that SU k can obtain s In the following, to relieve the need for frequent information exchange in the proposed learning algorithms, an alternative algorithm has been proposed based on best-response dynamics using locally available information. In the proposed algorithm, SU k estimates s [t] in the proposed algorithm. Then, considering such noisy information, convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm following bestresponse dynamics is studied. Since each SU can locally and independently update its own strategy without any information exchange among SUs, this proposed iterative algorithm could be implemented in a distributed manner.
VI. BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS WITH NOISY OBSERVATIONS
In [15] , we study how to use the capturing status feedback of the CSMA scheme y . From (7), it is clear that the estimation noise of β i will cause a bias (i.e., b = max(0, w)) in u k ; hence, best-response iterations in (15) will also involve random errors. Since the first derivative of u k is finite, the bias and variance of the random noise in best-response iterations should be also of O((S ) −1 ). As shown in log-linear learning, adding noise to the decisionmaking process enables equilibrium selection, taking advantage of the fact that the globally optimal NE is the only stochastically stable NE in potential games. Accordingly, in [34, Th. 3] , it is shown that bounded noise will asymptotically ensure the convergence of the best-response iterations to a neighborhood of the globally optimal solution in potential games. That is because suboptimal NE points are less stable than the globally optimal NE (i.e., global optimum) in a sense that small noise can cause the best-response iterations to diverge from the suboptimal NE while moving in the direction toward the globally optimal NE.
Similarly, in the proposed algorithm, best-response iterations involve errors, although they are random with bounded bias and variance. With a sufficiently large or increasing estimation window (i.e., S ), the random noise can be approximated as bounded noise. Therefore, it is expected that the best-response iterations converge to the global optimum. Mathematically, this can be presented as the following claim.
Claim 1: ∀ε > 0, an estimation window size can be selected (i.e., ∃S > 0) such that lim t→∞ inf Φ(β[t]) ≥ Φ max − ε with probability of one.
This claim declares that, by properly designing an estimation window size (i.e., S ), best-response iterations can get arbitrarily close to the globally optimal solution of (6), which is also the maximizer of the potential function (i.e., Φ), assuming
To confirm convergence of noisy best-response iterations to the globally optimal solution, Fig. 8 demonstrates the convergence process of the activity factors of three SUs in the first idle licensed channel. In addition, the convergence process based on the proposed learning-based non-game-theoretic algorithm in [15] is illustrated in Fig. 8 . It is clear that the game-theoretic algorithm accelerates the convergence in comparison with the algorithm proposed in [15] . Furthermore, Fig. 9 shows the convergence of the potential function. They confirm that the bestresponse iterations will stay in the neighborhood of the global optimum. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, using a potential game model, we have developed a distributed adaptive CSMA-based access design in which activity factors of SUs over multiple idle channels are adaptively adjusted. Via a potential game framework, it is established that the formulated game admits at least one purestrategy NE. In consideration of coupled constraints among SUs, sufficient conditions are presented to assure the feasibility of pure-strategy NEs. In addition, it is proven that the globally optimal solution is the Pareto-optimal NE.
Furthermore, the convergence properties of the best-response dynamics and log-linear dynamics of the formulated game are investigated. Assuming perfect knowledge of moves previously made by all SUs, it is proven that best-response iterations converge to a pure-strategy NE, which is not essentially the globally optimal solution. However, the log-linear process enables equilibrium refinement and convergence to the most socially desirable solution. Subsequently, in a game with noisy observations, it is shown that best-response iterations also converge with probability of one to a neighborhood of the global optimum.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Suppose that β = {β k } N s k=1 , where β k ∈ B k , is a purestrategy NE of game G, but it is not feasible, i.e., it violates at least one of the constraints in (6b). Further, suppose that m is the index of the channel that has the most severe violation, i.e., m = arg max i∈N a ( 
Thus, from (19) and (20), we have Subsequently, from (21) and (22), we have
Under the assumption of μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a , from (14), we have
Since δ ≥ (1/S), from (24) , it can be concluded that
Thus, based on (23) and (25), we have
This contradicts the assumption that β = {β k } N s k=1 is a purestrategy NE of game G according to the definition of NE in (12) . Thus, β is not a pure-strategy NE of G. Hence, it can be concluded that all pure-strategy NEs must be feasible if μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Let us assume that β = {β k } N s k=1 is the optimal solution of (6). Assuming μ i > μ th , ∀ i ∈ N a , β is the maximizer of the potential function Φ. Based on [29, Th. 2] , the maximizer of the potential function is the NE of the potential game. Hence, β is the NE of game G.
Subsequently, we need to establish that β is the Paretooptimal NE. Let assume that β is not Pareto optimal; then, there exists an arbitrary strategy profile β = {β k } N s k=1 such that
∀k ∈ N s , k = j (27) and for some j u j β j , β −j > u j (β j , β −j ).
As a result
Since β is an NE of game G, it is feasible based on Theorem 3 (i.e., 
Furthermore, considering that μ i 's are positive scalars, from (7) and (10), for an arbitrary β , we have
Consequently, based on (29)- (31), we have
This contradicts the fact that β is the maximizer of the potential function Φ. Thus, the optimal solution of (6) is the Paretooptimal pure-strategy NE of the game G.
